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Abstract. Patients that access their health records take more care of
their health and, when in therapy, commit more seriously to improve
their condition. This leads to a more effective and more efficient health-
care management, and is also in agreement with European directives on
data protection. However, accessing medical data can be risky. Security
should be assured and it should be evident to the patients, who has ac-
cess to what data and any violation to patient’s privacy requirements
should be reported. We call this property transparency.
Precisely this work looks into the Transparency Enhancing Tools that
have been proposed to increase people’s awareness about security and
privacy on the Internet, and discusses to which extent these tools can
empower transparency in healthcare.
Keywords: transparency enhancing tools; electronic health records; security
and privacy;
1 Introduction
European directives state how personal medical information should be managed
and protected: patients must have access and control over their information, be
informed about its content and purpose and give consent about its use and dis-
tribution [1]. Medical information is however peculiar. It should be owned by
patients but is generated and managed by healthcare institutions and profes-
sionals who keep it in custody for, and often from, the patients. Especially in
relation with Electronic Health Records (EHR), digital databases that contain
the historical of patient’s medical data, this situation creates conflicts. Granting
patient’s access to EHR is technically possible and this on the one hand seems
to embrace patients’ right to have control over personal data but, on the other
hand, it may threaten data security and violate people’s right to privacy [2, 3].
So, why granting patient’s access to EHR? The answer lies in studies that
show that patients who are let to consult their medical data commit more faith-
fully to therapies, care more about their health, and communicate better with
? This research is supported by FNR Luxembourg, CORE project ”Socio-Technical
Analysis of Security and Trust”, C11/IS/1183245 STAST supported by FNR Lux-
embourg, project I2R-APS-PFN-11STAS.
healthcare professionals [4–8]. Besides, the involvement of patients is a major
element for the success of long-lasting medical monitoring programs that require
patients with an history of the disease to share their health data over long peri-
ods of time. Here, patient’s involvement not only should be supported but must
be encouraged too.
One way to support patient’s involvement and to meet legislation and reg-
ulations enforced on personal medical data, is to embrace transparency. Trans-
parency suggests to be readable and intelligible to patients whether, whoever
manages their medical data, protects their right for privacy, and how. As well,
ensuring transparency should imply revealing and informing when a violation
has happened and give the means to account violators. Transparency can be
a way, we believe, to gain trust and foster patients to collaborate in medical
programs.
But how to ensure transparency is unclear. Incipient research in healthcare
does not provide effective solutions (see Section 4). Proposals believed to guar-
antee a degree of transparency do exist but in other domains than healthcare.
Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs), for instance, are meant to inform users
about how their data are collected, stored, processed and disclosed by Internet
service providers [9]. These are the tools that we intend to trail out in the medical
domain. But since TET’s have been proposed in completely different domains
and come in a diversity of options, before migrating them to the medical area,
we need to carefully assess their usefulness.
This paper studies TETs and analyses if their features can provide trans-
parency for security and privacy requirements for tools that let patient’s access-
ing their EHR.
2 Transparency for Security and Privacy
What does transparency mean in relation to security and privacy? The first
impression is that transparency conflicts with both. How can the access to a
resource be secured or private, and transparent at the same time? This apparent
conundrum dissolves once one clarifies that transparency does not refer to the
same objects as security and privacy do. Security and privacy are properties
about the data. Transparency is a property about other properties: it empowers
other properties by making evident to a human user their holding. A transparent
security is a security that holds evidently, in contrast to an obscure security that
holds stealthily. A transparent privacy has a similar meaning.
In particular, to secure the access to information means providing access
to authorised users as well as protecting access from unauthorised users. This
is usually obtained with access control [10]. Access control is not designed to
be transparent, since such tools have not been designed to address regulation
requirements stating that users must be informed. To become transparent, access
control should be “visualized” in how it works to protect accesses to resources.
This can be obtained by showing to the data owner, when and who has accessed
his/her data, what application created them, where data are stored and whether
accesses comply with the access control policies he/she has defined.
To ensure data privacy generally means to anonymize and obfuscate the data
so that certain sensitive pieces of information, such as identities, are not easily
revealed. For instance, medical data can have any link with patients’ identifica-
tion removed before being available for research. Privacy is usually obtained by
applying Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) [11–14]. PETs alone do not
ensure transparency, again because they are not designed to address regulation
requirements stating that users must be informed. To make PETs transparent,
data owners should be informed that their records have been handled accord-
ingly to declared policies and data protection laws. Notably, such practice has
been proved to lead to higher perceived trustworthiness [15].
Transparency empowers security and privacy, and it can be employed to make
them verifiable, auditable and accountable [16]. Finally, we believe, transparency
must give assurance that the data reported to users are accurately presented
and faithfully coming from official sources. This means making integrity and
authenticity transparent. The relation between transparency and these two last
security properties deserves a research question in itself. It is beyond the scope
of this paper’s research and it is left for future work.
3 Transparency Enhancing Tools
Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs) have been proposed in the literature
to provide an accurate and comprehensible insight on how Internet providers
collect, store, process and disclose user’s private data. TETs attempt to provide
a better understanding of privacy policies and an insight on third party’s tracking
behaviour. In so doing, TETs aim to promote security awareness [9].
From research on currently available TETs it is agreed that there are some
known desirable characteristics that they should offer. TETs should keep logs of
what happens and inform a user when his/her security preferences are matched
or when these are compromised. TETs should also offer functions that help a
user to exert control over the personal data he/she has released [17] and should,
in short, be proxies acting on the user’s behalf and inform him/her when and
how personal data are harvested, stored, and processed [9, 18]. For all this, the
need for TETs has been repeatedly recognized [9].
Moreover, TETs must be autonomous in interpreting user’s policies, reveal
any violation of these policies, and they should advise the user on how to proceed
or who to contact when a policy violation occurs [11].
TETs have also been proposed as tools for auditing [18]. Visual tools for auditing
are expected to be transparent in themselves (i.e., to produce their own logs and
audit trails), so to prove how they have been used and on what data their
decisions have been based upon. The auto-transparency, a property that would
be desirable in general, is however meant to be read and understood only by
professionals, and it is currently unavailable to lay users.
4 Transparency for Security and Privacy in Healthcare
Transparency is believed to be a precondition for service improvement, data
quality and productivity and a powerful driver for auditing and accountabil-
ity: in healthcare, transparency has been suggested to empower patients and
caregivers [19]. Excepting this, there is not much research on how transparency
can be applied in the healthcare practice. We have not found research about
transparency to empower patient’s accessing their EHR, except some discussion
about access control and usability requirements, which may be indirectly related
to transparency issues [20]. Visualizing access control has been suggested as a
mean to let a patient have an understandable overview of the EHR’s network,
with an inter-connected view showing which different medical departments share
which sub-records of a patient’s EHR. In this integrated view, a patient can select
a part of his/her EHR and view in more detail who is accessing it and for what
purpose. An example of such a tool was proposed in [20] and its security and
privacy requirements have already been studied on previous research [21] [22].
Even less seems to exist about transparency and privacy in EHR.
In this still unexplored research, studies done in other domains can help
to foresee what transparency can do for healthcare. For instance, it has been
shown that personal data can be logged without compromising the privacy, and
that users can verify what actions were performed on their private data and
if these actions comply with a chosen privacy policy [23]. This is surely an
interesting property but must be make usable before being handed-down to
patients. Inspiring is the state of the art on TETs, the transparency enhancing
tools introduced in Section 3. Each TET is meant to empower specific security
and privacy aspects. We can thus compile a list of common security and privacy
requirements for healthcare (in particular for EHR, see Section 5) and compare
and discuss whether the TETs selected for analysis (Figure 1 in Section 6) can
empower those requirements. This is exactly the methodology we follow in this
paper.
5 Security and Privacy Requirements in Healthcare
This section presents EHR’s security and privacy requirements (focusing on ac-
cess control and privacy) that need to be transparent to the patient when s/he
accesses the EHR.
Access Control
RBAC: Role Based Access Control has been proposed in the ISO standard
for EHR communications’ security [24] and in the HL7 RBAC from the
Healthcare Permission Catalog [25]. The ISO standard includes a description
of healthcare roles, including the patient as subject of care, and defines a
structure to organize the content of the medical record. Further, it includes
sensitivity levels to express security levels for different types of data, and
which roles can access those.
BTG: Break-the-glass has been proposed as part of access control in health-
care and gives the possibility to override (temporarily or as specified) the
access control policy in a controlled manner, for instance, in emergency or
unanticipated situations [26];
PURUSE: Purpose of use has been suggested by the HL7 Security Technical
Committee [25] to associate the context with the access control rules. Ex-
amples of purpose of use that can be associated to specific accesses can be:
emergency accesses, asking for a second opinion and research usage;
EXCEP: Exceptions were proposed by research focusing on devising a patient’s
access control model [22] and their aim is, for instance, to give more or less
permissions to a specific user than his/her role normally detains. Private
notes are an example, i.e., healthcare professionals can be allowed to have
private compositions relating to a patient’s EHR therefore only accessed by
the professional who created them and not by all the users that may detain
the same role as that professional;
TEMPCON: Temporal constraints were also proposed by [22]. These are needed
to add a limited timeframe to access control permissions. TEMPCON can
be specially useful for healthcare professionals that work on shifts. These
constraints are also necessary in order to create temporary roles, which are
defined for a specific limited time (e.g., delegation or BTG);
DELEG: Delegation is also part of the model proposed in [22] and it allows
granting temporary access permissions to healthcare professionals who nor-
mally do not treat the patient (i.e., asking for a second opinion).
OBLS: Obligations in healthcare were proposed in [26]. These are secondary
actions triggered by primary actions. In access control, obligations can be
performed on a GRANT or DENY of an access request, for example, when
a BTG is requested, an obligation can be triggered to send an email to the
responsible authority to check whether that BTG access was valid or not;
AUTH: European Directives [1] state that there needs to be a description of
how personal data must be collected and processed. Regarding access control,
this data can refer to patient’s identification and authentication information
(e.g., including patient’s credentials for authentication and authorisation);
SECAUTH: Secure authentication mechanisms with unique identification cards
and one time passwords as well as secure authentication and authorization
features are proposed in [21];
Privacy
ANONYM: The European Recommendation on the Protection of Medical
Data [27] states that patient’s data identification has to be anonymised for
specific purposes, for instance, for research or educational purposes.
6 Comparing Security Requirements with TET’s features
We have studied twenty TETs. Figure 1 summarizes our work. In the first column
we name the TET together with a reference and/or the url(s) where to find the
TET’s description or its specification. In the second column we give an acronym
to the TET, which will be used later to identify each TET. In the third and last
column we briefly describe the feature of the TET relevant to this paper’s work.
The considered TETs have been presented in very disparate domains. To
compare them, we highlight in each TET what features it has that, somehow,
adds transparency to security and privacy. We end up having eight categories,
numbered from 1 to 8. Each category represents a feature to show, represent or
visualize specific elements that we have judged relevant in respect to security
and privacy. Namely:
1 - what roles access what owner’s data
2 - how data about credentials are used and processed
3 - what data are shared among 3rd party institutions and
professionals that can give away information about who uses that data,
with some implicit information about their purpose of use
4 - how data about credentials are collected by 3rd parties
5 - how authentication credentials are securely stored
6 - if log entries are encrypted so personal data can be anonymised
7 - how data about authentication credentials are stored and collected
8 - what documents with authentication credentials are disclosed and
to whom.
Figure 2 shows the results of matching TETs with the security and privacy
requirements listed in Section 5. TETs (listed in the first column) are compared
with the requirements (listed in the first row). If a TET, say in row r, has a
feature falling into categories from 1 to 8, say i, that we judge able to add
transparency to a security and privacy requirement, say in column c, we write
the number i in the cell standing at the intersection between r and c.
For example, in reference to Figure 2, and for Mozilla Privacy Icons (MPI),
we find a 1 under the RBAC and BTG (among other) columns. In fact, MPI
engine detects what a website does with a user’s personal data. For instance it
detects whether the site gives (or never gives) data to advertisers, or whether it
may sell (never sell) one’s personal data, or whether the site may give (gives) data
to law enforcement only when a legal process is followed. All such situations are
represented with icons. The same mechanism, we judge, can be as well employed
to visualize what roles access what owner’s data (i.e., category 1). So it can
make visually explicit RBAC policies as well as exceptions or BTG accesses to
patient’s data.
In summary, Figure 2 shows that nine of the twenty analyzed TETs have at
least one feature that helps make transparent one access control or one privacy
requirement. Surprisingly, more than half (eleven in twenty) of the analysed
TETs did not fulfill any of the security and privacy requirements that we have
identified. These TETs are simply add-on applications that add visualization
effects to PETs, or enhance them with educational and awareness capabilities
(more discussion on these results in Section 7).
Among the nine TETs that instead have relevant features for our study,
seven provide transparency mostly for access control requirements. They relate
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with showing how personal data are used, processed and collected both by the
application at hand as well as by third parties (i.e., categories 1 to 4, 7 and 8).
This includes the collection and processing of authentication credentials (e.g.,
user identification and passwords). Only two among these nine TETs fulfill the
privacy requirement ANONYM. They do so because they provide a way to detect
and flag whether encryption is used on logs (i.e., category 6).
7 Discussion and Conclusion
We believe that TETs features can be a starting point to provide patients with
information regarding how their personal data are being used, who has accessed
them, for what purpose, when and where data are stored. This visual information
can be extended to the parts of a patient’s EHR that are being shared among
third parties and, hopefully, also for what purpose. This information can be
presented to the user depending on specific needs, roles, contextual information
and other variables. Almost half of the analyzed TETs can be useful in this
situation as they can provide for transparency in such different ways (i.e., with
images, icons, text, visual interactive interfaces). However, further analysis is
required to decide which of these features better adapt to the patient’s centered
tool, not only in terms of usability as described, but also in terms of security
goals. A patient’s access control model may require more fine-grained access
control and versatile accesses (e.g., access by a patient’s guardian or by family
members) and this may necessitate the integration of different features, such
as those required to distinguish roles and identities. For this purpose, we need
to look more carefully and in deep detail in the TETs’ features and techniques
available, in future research.
In this paper we considered only one privacy requirement which, in more
precise terms, relates to anonymization. Only two TETs provide features that
can be applied to add transparency, in order to show that data are anonymized.
Again, the TETs in question have ways to flag that encryption is used on data.
This can be a first step to protect patients’ identity as well as more sensitive
information, but anonymization cannot simply be achieved by encrypting data.
Other solutions for transparency beyond flagging that encryption is used are
thus required to detect and report that anonymization is guaranteed. It seems
that we may have to look into research outside TETs for this purpose.
Other Considerations. Our analysis of TETs revealed features, not shown in
Figure 2 and not directly related with transparency, which we believe deserve to
be mentioned and discussed.
(a) Current TETs are mostly about improving PETs by adding ”easier to
understand” visual features into the way information regarding privacy policies
is presented, so to improve usability features: we have seen that TETs can provide
transparency for most of our proposed access control requirements but, during
our analysis, we could not find details on what techniques and mechanisms are
F
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used to, for instance, detect, collect and process user’s private data in relation
to Internet browsing. Some TETs features can provide (simple) visual means to
display information usage and checking of what private data users and third-
parties can access and for what purpose. These visual means are a key factor to
provide transparency for patient’s access control. It must be possible for lay and
non-lay users to easily see and understand whatever is in compliance with their
privacy policies but also what has been breached.
(b) Current TETs are mostly introduced to provide awareness and education
to the user : in fact, the majority of users do not regularly read privacy poli-
cies, and even when they do, these are very hard to understand and do not
usually support user’s decisions on what to do on a website [28]. Nevertheless,
other research shows that people appreciate that a website is concerned about
their privacy. People buy more often and more expensive goods from web sites
that publicly declare that they care about protecting the privacy of their cus-
tomers (e.g., see [29]). Besides, it has been proved that usable privacy policies
foment trust [30]. Therefore, usability is a fundamental requirement that must
be considered in addition to security and privacy. Unfortunately, there was not
much data available concerning usability experiments and results for the TETs
analysed in this paper.
(c) Current TETs mostly analyse user’s behaviour on the Internet to profiling
their needs in terms of privacy : the information of insecure behaviour derived
from this profiling can help the user to be more careful of their privacy when using
the Internet. Profiling techniques can be used as well in a patient’s access control
tool, raising alarms to patients when an access violation occurs, so making them
more attentive for signs and specific issues that would be normally ignored.
Limitations. The TETs reviewed in this paper have been described in other
reviews [9, 18] or in proprietary websites that give insight about TETs features.
We did not use, test and analyze the TETs ourselves. This is left for future
work. Also, we did not discuss usability of the considered TETs. But usability
is a key feature, since a TET may fail to communicate its message clearly. How
to measure this gap between intention to communicate a message and success in
communicating that same message is intensively debated in usable security. We
have considered usability requirements out of scope in this paper’s analysis.
Conclusion. We looked into Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs), and dis-
cussed whether such technology can provide for transparency of security and
privacy policies in healthcare. We question whether TETs can help foster pa-
tient’s trust on how their personal and medical data are handled. TETs have
promising features, and our analysis reveals that they are a valid starting point
for our research. But further research is needed: there is the need for user studies
to make sure that TETs work in practice and, more importantly, in the health-
care practice where user interactions with technology are very diversified and
therefore very challenging.
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